Administrative Law in Minnesota by Brown, William
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 6
10-15-1989
Administrative Law in Minnesota
William Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Brown, Administrative Law in Minnesota, 9 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges. (1989)
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol9/iss2/6
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN MINNESOTA
Hon. William Brown
PRESENTATION OF WILLIAM BROWN
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, STATE OF MINNESOTA
TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
ANNUAL MEETING - October 6, 1988
I would like to thank Kent Todd for inviting me here
this morning to discuss the issue of due process safeguards in
high-volume administrative proceedings. Also, I think that the
program which has been put together for this conference is
excellent and contains the topics which are of primary interest
to those of us who are engaged in administrative law. It
demonstrates the vitality of our system here, and I think we can
be particularly proud of the fact that Kent Todd is the president
of the organization. He is a person who goes about his work in
a somewhat quiet and very effective fashion and is low-key about
his accomplishments, but I think it appropriate that we should
thank him and the others from his department who organized this
fine convention; and again it is a real credit to Minnesota's
administrative law system to have had Kent as your president for
this past year.
To begin, I would like to describe the current structure
of our administrative law system in Minnesota. We do have
several agencies involved in conducting administrative hearings,
one being the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings, which
is Minnesota's Central Panel Agency. We are a separate
department in state government and conduct all administrative
hearings for the state with the major exceptions of unemployment
hearings and welfare eligibility hearings. Currently we have 29
Workiers' Compensation Judges, 9 Administrative Law Judges, 30
support staff, and myself in the office. As I indicated, we are
an independent agency. Our Workers' Compensation Judges conduct
all Workers' Compensation trials in the state, an we do handle
about 4,000 cases per year. Our Administrative Law Judges
conduct contested case hearings for state agencies. A contested
case is statutorily defined as a proceeding before an agency in
which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are required by law or constitutional right to'be
determined after an agency hearing. The cases, among others,
include hearings on human rights charges, securities regulation,
professional licensure, utilities regulation, transportation
regulation and employee disciplinary cases for the state and
local governments. We have been hearing liquor license revoca-
tion cases for cities, and most recently have undertaken a pilot
project on child support hearings. With the primary exceptions
of human rights cases and state employee disciplinary cases,
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our judges' recommendations are finally dealt with in the
executive branch, either by the Board of Commission in charge of
the activity or an agency head. Judicial review of their
decision is by the Intermediate Court of Appeals. The appeal of
workers' compensation decisions is to the Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals, with judicial review by the Minnesota Supreme
Court.
The unemployment compensation hearings in Minnesota
are conducted by the Appellate Office of the Department of Jobs
and Training. There are 22 referees in the office and the
case load involves approximately 12,000 appeals per year. Their
decisions may be appealed to the Department's Commissioner
Representatives and judicial review is by the Intermediate Court
of Appeals. Public assistance eligibility hearings are conducted
by 9 referees within the Appeals and Contracts Division of the
Department of Human Services, or the county's reterqe, with the
Commissioner being the final authority and judicial reviaw is
district court.
Over the past several years there have been a variety
of attempts to bring these units together in a combined Office
of Administrative Hearings, but for one reason or another that
has not happened. Having been involved with the major entities,
I think I can say with reasonable assurance that the systems
which we currently have for conducting administrative hearings
in Minnesota are working very well. The basic administrative
law system for contested cases and rulemaking in the Office of
Administrative Hearings has a comprehensive set of procedures in
both statute and rule relating to those activities and functions
very effectively in dealing with those hearings.
Our workers' compensation hearing process, revised by
legislation in 1987, and with the addition of several judges,
has experienced a somewhat dramatic reduction in delays in the
hearing process, and we project that the goal in Minnesota of
being afforded a hearing within six months of the filing of an
initial claim petition will be reached by late 1989.
Our unemployment compensation hearing process has
repeatedly met Federal standards for timeliness, and in April of
this year we finished the promulgation of a new set of rules
which, I believe, establish a clear due process system for
hearings on unemployment benefit and tax matters. My discussions
with the assistant commissioner in charge of the welfare appeals
division indicates that the procedures as well as the production
of that office have greatly improved and the additional staff
and resource commitment to the office has proven to be well
worthwhile.
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SO I think it is fair to say that the State of
Minnesota's administrative law system is very good, and that is
due primarily to the people who are in the system. It is the
judges and support staff within the system which dictate whether
the goal of administrative law, which is to facilitate the
optimum delivery of government services to the public, is
obtained. And the primary requirement of such a system is that
the decision maker be fair and impartial. This was clearly set
forth in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Goldberg v.
Kelly, which required a due process hearing prior to the termi-
nation of AFDC benefits. An impartial decision maker is
essential. The judge must approach each case with an open mind.
His or her concern should be to provide a fair hearing and a
prompt and just decision under the law. It has been said, quite
appropriately, that "The judge shall know nothing about the
parties, everything about the case. He shall do everything for
justice, nothing for himself, nothing for his patron, nothing
for his sovereign." (Rufus Choate))
And I think in this regard we have been extremely
fortunate in Minnesota. Our laws call for administrative judges
who are fair and impartial in all respects. Our Administrative
Procedure Act provides that all Administrative Law Judges shall
have demonstrated knowledge of administrative procedures and
shall be free of any political or economic association that
would impair their ability to function officially in a fair and
objective manner. All Workers' Compensation Judges shall be
learned in the law, shall have demonstrated knowledge of Workers'
Compensation laws, and shall be free of any political or economic
association that would impair their ability to function officiall
in a fair and objective manner. The Unemployment Compensation
law in Minnesota relating to the appointment of our Unemployment
Judges provides that he or she shall not hear any appeal in
which he or she has a direct interest and shall be impartial.
Clearly then, the primary requirement of a functioning adminis-
trative law system is that it be fair and perceived as fair by
the participants in the system.
The second major component is competence, and it is
not only the competence of the judges in hearings and deciding
the cases. It is also the competence of the support staff and
the system in general to ensure that you can always respond
precisely as to the status of a file, when the case will be
4eard, and when it is likely to be decided.
A third component--and I have experienced quite a lot
f concern about this in the past--is consistency. Consistency
s easily obtainable when there is a clear statute or court
recedent involved. And I think it is essential that people
know what to expect and what impact their action or inaction is
likely to have. But when there is doubt and the agency must act
to clarify or interpret the application of the law, and the
people conducting the hearings disagree with that interpretation,
particularly when that judge is housed with the agency, a
relatively significant issue is raised--that of the judge's
independence versus the agency's established position. If an
Administrative Law Judge, in good conscience, does not follow an
agency directive on the interpretation of a statute, and if the
agency attempts to involve itself in that persons' decision-making
process, it will threaten the perception of fairness. At the
same time, I think that the person trying the case and making
the decision must understand that inconsistency results in
misunderstanding and confusion, among parties and potential
parties, and ongoing interpretations and final decision of
executive branch officials are given weight by the courts.
One must address, in this regard, the issue of having
agency employees preside in agency hearings and make case
dispositions. While this collides with the ancient maxim that
no man should be the judge of his own case, it has been held by
the courts that due process is violated only where the decision
maker has prejudged a specific case or is so biased as to be
incapable of properly deciding the case on the merits of the
evidence. The combination of the investigatory, prosecutory and
adjudicatory functions within a single agency does not per se
offend due process. Withrow v. Larkin, 42L U.S. 35 (1975).
Only where it can be shown that there is a risk of actual bias
or prejudgment does due process require disqualification. In
Minnesota, our Supreme Court held in GinQ v. Board of Education,
7 N.W.2d 544 (1943), that the fact an administrative body acts
in the triple capacity of complainant, prosecutor and judge does
not subject it's decision to attack for lack of due process of
law. I do think that where this situation exists it is important
to maintain an organizational separation between the hearing
officers and agency employees who are performing executive
functions.
The final component is efficiency, which means giving
notice of the hearing, holding the hearing and issuing the
decision in a timely fashion. We are dealing with cases,
particularly in unemployment compensation, workers' compensation
and public assistance, where justice delayed is clearly justice
denied. People have to know whether or not they are entitled to
these benefits in a timely fashion because they are obviously in
need of them; and if they are receiving them unjustifiably due
to a prior decision, they may be asked to repay what they have
received. Thus it is critical, and our systems reflect this
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with the timeliness standards and the emphasis on delay reduction,
that the decisions involved be issued in a timely fashion.
These are the components which I find essential to a
good administrative law system--fairness, competence, consistency,
and efficiency. And they must be fashioned in such a way as to
meet the requirements of constitutional due process, because the
cases which we deal with in the high-volume administrative
hearings which I have described, clearly involve what the courts
have concluded are property rights. Two constitutional amendments
assure that both Federal and state agencies must accord due
process to individuals affected by agency actions in these
areas. The fifth amendment commands the Federal government that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. The fourteenth amendment provides "nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Thus, the fourteenth amendment
incorporates due process requirements as applied to the states
which are the same as those applicable to the Federal government.
Henry Culp Davis, in reviewing the Court's decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly, found that the Court required ten elements in a trial-type
aearing: timely and adequate notice, an opportunity to defend
by confronting any adverse witness, oral presentation of arguments,
Dral presentation of evidence, cross-examination of adverse
witnesses, disclosure to the claimant of opposing evidence, the
right to retain an attorney, a determination resting solely on
the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing, the decision
naker should state the reasons for his/her determination, and
Lndicate the evidence relied on, and an impartial decision maker
is essential.
I find it an inherent responsibility of an administra-
:ive law system to clearly set forth and advise the system's
)articipants of the procedural safeguards which guaranty the due
rocess required by our Constitution and case law. Justice Frank-
.urter succinctly said in McNab v. United States, a 1943 case,
hat the history of liberty has largely been the history of
rocedural safeguards. The procedures which have been developed
o guaranty due process rights in administrative hearings differ
rom the judicial model in most cases. Normally while reference
s made to common law rules of evidence in making evidentiary
ulings, Administrative Law Judges are not bound by those rules.
In Mathews v. Elridae, a 1976 Supreme Court case, the
ourt stated: "The judicial model for an evidentiary hearing is
ot required nor even the most effective method of decision
aking in all circumstances." Administrative procedure must
evelop as a compromise between what a British judge once called
The methods of natural justice and those of courts of justice."
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For areas where there are high-volume case loads, such as the
unemployment compensation systems, we are dealing with what
amounts to a people's court. People must be advised as succinctly
as possible as to what the procedure is, what the issues are in
the case, and how they can be affected by the decision. And the
procedural system which is designed must respect and foster
individual dignity. A process which results in perfectly
accurate decisions is unacceptable if it causes alienation and a
loss of individual dignity.
In dealing with the development of administrative law
procedures and high-volume case load situations, I have found
that the areas which raise concern are: (1) that people be
properly notified what the hearing is about with respect to the
issues involved in the case; (2) that some type of discovery be
allowed at least as to who the other party's witnesses are and
what documents are to be introduced; (3) that all parties at the
hearing be treated with dignity and respect and, to the extent
possible, that an atmosphere be created that allows them to tell
their side of the story; (4) that a decision be issued in a
timely fashion subsequent to the hearing and clearly explain
what the impact of that decision is on the parties to the
hearing; and, most importantly, that the judge who hears and
decides the case be fair and impartial and understand that it is
critical that he or she is perceived as fair and impartial by
the parties to the action.
Finally, I would like to address an issue which I
think is coming quickly into the area of high-volume administrative
hearings. That is, when such hearings are conducted through the
telephone hearing process do they create significant due process
issues. I think it is fairly well established that the telephone
hearing process can meet due process standards. However, if
such hearings significantly compromise a party's opportunity to
be heard by the manner in which the particular hearing is
conducted, they could be, to that extent, violative of due
process. Sterling v. D.C. Department of Employee Services,
App. 513 A.2d 253 (1984).
In Minnesota, in our highest volume appeal system,
unemployment compensation, our statute provides that the hearing
may be conducted by means of a telephone conference call except
that the appellant may request that the hearing be conducted in
person.
The types of hearings where telephone conferences are
used involve gingle party issues, such as availability for work,
and cases where the parties are at such locations as to make a
1rompt in-person hearing impractical. And there are certain
equities involved in that type of situation. If there is going
to be substantial delay in holding an in-person hearing in an
outstate area, it would certainly seem, considering the types of
cases these are, that a telephone conference hearing would be
appropriate. In Sterling v. District of Columbia, the D.C.
Court indicated in response to a petitioner's contention that
telephone hearings should be abolished, that it was inclined to
view that the elimination of telephone hearings might increase
the risk of error because fewer people might be able to participate
in hearings and because overall parties' opportunities to
confront each other contemporaneously might be curtailed. In
saying this, the Court was aware that the quality of confronta-
tion is diminished when the clash of the parties is by telephone
rather than in person. The Court also found telephone hearings
to be a reasonable means of conserving administrative and fiscal
resources. It did, however, hold that the particular hearing in
;uestion did not meet the due process test because the appeals
examiner cut off the receptionist who evidently did not know
ahat the call was about, so there was no opportunity to be
heard.
I think the processes used in our telephone hearings
should be specifically set forth in rule form. The procedures
relating to when a request for an in-person hearing will be
granted or denied, how exhibits are to be handled, how the
parties can appear in such a hearing--for instance, one party
nay be willing to travel to where the referee is located and
appear in person, with the other appearing by telephone--should
De clearly set forth in rule form. And we did accomplish this
Ln Minnesota in April of this year. Minnesota now has established
:ules which are available to all parties on the manner and means
Ln which telephone conference hearings are to be conducted in
inemployment cases.
And that is indicative of what I consider a necessity
.or providing due process in high-volume case load situations.
n established set of rules which are sufficiently concise and
rief that they can be provided to and understood by the parties.
o people know what to expect at these hearings and come into
hem with as little fear and uneasiness as possible. For many,
his is their first involvement with a judicial-type process and
o the extent they can be advised, in advance, of what is going
o occur and be made to understand that they have some control-
ver the situation, the more prepared they will be to freely
xplain their side of the case. And in the end it is that right
Ihich will make them feel they have had a fair hearing.
Thank you and I will be happy to respond to any
estions.
